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Professor Koppelman pays me the compliment of respond-
ing to my recent article. Reviving Tocqueville's America: The 
Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery.1 In particu-
lar, I am grateful for his kind remark that the article is a "major 
contribution to scholarship" as the "first unified description" of 
the Rehnquist's Court jurisprudence, because the major ambi-
tion of the paper, as Professor Koppelman himself acknowl-
edges, is descriptive.2 
Unfortunately, Professor Koppelman comprehensively mis-
states my normative position and his reply is thus misdirected. 
Professor Koppelman says that I think the Rehnquist Court has 
been following and should be following a "principle of subsidiar-
ity. "3 He then argues that his principle invests the Court with 
such substantial political discretion as to make it a kind of oli-
garchy.4 It is important to clarify at the outset that my article 
does not at all endorse the Court's fabrication and enforcement 
of the abstract {Xinciple of subsidiarity. Instead the article dis-
cusses the manner in which the Court has revived decentralizing 
provisions that are actually in the Constitution such as the limita-
tions of the commerce clause, the protection for joint expression 
afforded by the First Amendment and the neutrality principle 
• Professor, Northwestern School of Law. I am grateful for the comments of Steven 
Calabresi, Robert Delahunty, Nelson Lund, Mark Movsesian, Michael Rappaport, and 
Ilya Somin. 
1. See John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's 
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002). 
2. Andrew Koppelman, How "Decentralizarion" Rarionalizes Oligarchy: John McGinnis 
and the Rehnquist Coun, 20 CoN ST. COMMENT. 11, 12 (2003) (hereinafter "Koppelman"). 
3. /d. at 12, 15 (arguing that the ovcrarching aim of the Rehnquist Court is sub-
sidiarity). 
4. /d. at 15, 18. 
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inherent in the religion clauses. To be sure, such provisions show 
that the Constitution contains an underlying theme of decen-
tralization and I believe that theme is attractive as a policy mat-
ter for reasons I discuss, but that is a separate matter. The 
Court's warrant extends only to enforcing constitutional provi-
sions, not a constitutional theme, and the Rehnquist Court, like 
any other court, should be applauded insofar as it interprets con-
stitutional provisions correctly, which in my view requires taking 
account of text, original meaning, and precedent. Contrary to 
Professor Koppelman's claim, such an interpretivist Court enjoys 
no more political discretion when enforcing decentralizing provi-
sions than when it enforces other provisions of the Constitution.5 
Oddly enough, it is Professor Koppelman who consistently 
evaluates Supreme Court decisions according to his own political 
discretion. Rather than criticize the basis of the Rehnquist Court's 
holdings by appealing to text, original understanding, or even a 
close reading of judicial precedent, Professor Koppelman claims 
that a broad application of the Court's new decisions will lead to 
consequences of which he disapproves.6 This method of criticism is 
doubly defective. First, he does not himself offer any theory of in-
terpretation and in particular fails to observe the many ways in 
which attention to text and precedent will prevent the conse-
quences he finds so unfortunate. Second, harping on particular con-
sequences rather than building textual and precedential arguments 
against the Court suggests that he is guilty of exactly the same fail-
ings of which he wrongly attempts to convict the Court-shaping 
constitutional doctrine to reach preferred policy goals. 
Because the Court's justification for its discrete decentraliz-
ing decisions derives from the Constitution itself, I never under-
took the burden of demonstrating that the Constitution's provi-
sions were wise public policy.7 The article does note some 
5. /d. at 15. 
6. See, e.g., id. at 23-24 (Rehnquist Court's commerce clause jurisprudence may 
endanger environmental laws). 
7. Koppelman wrongly suggests that I disavow my defense of the Court. See Kop-
pelman, supra note 2, at 14 n.l3. Professor Koppelman once again fails to distinguish be-
tween my jurisprudential defense of the Court's work and my discussion of the policy 
benefits of the Constitution that the Court is enforcing. I freely acknowledge that my es-
say does not conclusively demonstrate the policy wisdom of all the provisions of the Con-
stitution whose policy justification I discuss. That latter "defense" could hardly be ac-
complished in an eighty-page article who primary objective is to describe developments 
in the Rehnquist Court, as Professor Koppelman himself acknowledges, and then to 
show how they are reviving a unifying theme implicit in the texts of the Constitution. I 
also freely admit that I generally admire the consequences of the Constitution- a charter 
for decentralized and limited government. That is an entirely different matter from be-
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modern support for policies that these decentralizing provisions 
implement-support that Professor Koppelman misunderstands 
and in some cases misstates. Given the primarily descriptive ob-
jectives of my piece, this support also helps explain why the 
Court may be restoring some of the original Constitution, just as 
I explained how political theories of the time led the New Deal 
and Warren Courts to neglect these provisions. In any event, as a 
matter of political theory, Professor Koppelman offers no 
framework for assessing circumstances in which centralization of 
norm creation is better than decentralization. Without a theory, 
Professor Koppelman can provide anecdotes about the examples 
of decentralization he dislikes but he contributes little or nothing 
to the political theory debate over the relative merits of centrali-
zation and decentralization.8 
But what is most puzzling about Professor Koppelman's 
criticisms of the Rehnquist Court and of my article, even on the 
terms of his own misunderstanding, is his full-throated endorse-
ment of Roe v. Wade. 9 If any decision can be criticized as inevi-
tably bound up in political decisions and as representing the tri-
umph of oligarchy, it is Roe. Without relying on a determinate 
text of the Constitution but on its own assertion of what rights 
are "fundamental," seven members of the Court invalidated the 
laws of a large majority of the states and put the issue of abortion 
beyond democratic control. In contrast, even if the Court were to 
enforce a principle of subsidiarity, it would at least have a coher-
ent body of economic theory to choose the appropriate level for 
decisionmaking. Moreover, at the level chosen the decisions 
would be made more democratically than was the case in Roe. 
lieving the Court should make decisions by a case by case policy calculus about the bene-
fits of decentralization. 
8. In response, Professor Koppelman argues that he needs no framework because 
a framework is impossible, "separate from particular judgments about good decisions." 
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 15 n.14. But yet again Professor Koppelman fails to distin-
guish between jurisprudential theory and policy defenses of constitutional provisions. 
Professor Koppelman's claim comes in the context of his argument that judicial decisions 
cannot appropriately enforce a "principle of subsidiarity." But I never suggest they 
should. As I note in the text, my argument about the need for a theory of decentraliza-
tion comes in evaluating constitutional provisions, where Framers can take policy consid-
erations into account. In this context, it is certainly helpful to have some theory about 
decentralization to inform overall judgments about whether a particular limitation that 
the Constitution has imposed on the federal government is wise. For instance, it would be 
hard to provide a principled opposition to a constitutional amendment giving the federal 
government power to define the nature of marriage without considering such issues as 
spillover effects and competition in legal regimes-the very things about which a theory 
of decentralization guides our thinking. 
9. /d. at 36-37. 
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Professor Koppelman's endorsement of Roe suggests that 
he has not seriously addressed as a matter of political theory the 
problem which the decentralizing provisions of the Constitution 
help solve. If we were sure that the Court could find exactly 
what set of social norms would make the best republic, the Con-
stitution should have set up a structure by which the Court dic-
tates such norms. But the Constitution is more skeptical of the 
dictates of rulers and more sympathetic to experiments by the 
people. It thus left the appropriate contours of social norms, out-
side of a few core sets of rights and process norms, to more expe-
rientially and experimentally based processes that my article at-
tempts to describe. 10 
I. PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN'S 
MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND MISSTATEMENTS 
It is most regrettable that Professor Koppelman attributes 
to me many views I do not hold. As a result, he spends much of 
his essay gleefully sifting the stuffing from straw men. He ap-
pears to believe that I want the Supreme Court to enforce a 
"principle of subsidiarity."n This is simply wrong and it is a mis-
take that pervades his entire essay. As Professor Koppelman 
admits, my article rarely even mentions the term subsidiarity,12 
and never suggests that Court should enforce this abstract prin-
ciple. Instead, it explains how the Court is enforcing the decen-
tralizing constitutional provisions-such as the limitations of 
commerce clause, the free speech clause, the religion clauses, 
and the jury trial clauses. This essential point is not obscure, but 
appears over and over again in the article: "The Rehnquist 
Court is rediscovering the provisions of the Constitution that 
create alternate forums [to national democracy] for norm crea-
tion. "13 The article observes later that this movement "restores a 
degree of the Constitution's original meaning"14 and discusses 
how this restoration is properly limited by respect for precedent. 
10. My article shows how the limitations of the enumerated powers provide the states 
with the opportunity to compete in producing social norms where those norms implicate sub-
stantial externalities. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 519-21. It also shows how the First Amend-
ment allows mediating institutions to compete in producing expressive norms, a category 
where the negative externalities of government regulation are thought to be greater on the 
whole than the negative externalities of the activities themselves. /d. at 528-29. 
11. Koppelman, Sllpra note 2, at 12, 15. 
12. Jd. at 12. 
13. McGinnis, Sllpra note 1, at 490. 
14. Jd. It does not do so completely, of course, because its respect for precedent. 
See, e.g., id. at 522-23. 
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In several places the article uses text and history to defend the 
Court's decentralizing decisions. 15 The article closes by observing 
that the Court is justified in enforcing these provisions against 
majorities, national or state, as the case may be, because these 
constitutional provisions have been approved by a supermajori-
tarian ratification that overcomes many of the defects of ordi-
nary centralized majoritarian processes.16 It is thus patently cen-
tral to the thesis of my article that the Court is enforcing 
constitutional provisions through an interpretation that is guided 
by their original meaning as modified by established precedent. 
Despite my many citations in the preceding paragraph to 
my own article, Professor Koppelman in rebuttal suggests that 
this reply "shifts emphasis" from "decentralization" to "textual-
ism and originalism."17 But he does not provide any evidence of 
the shift in my jurisprudential position- neither evidence that 
my original article argued that the Court should enforce a prin-
ciple of subsidiarity apart from the decentralizing texts in the 
Constitution nor evidence that it failed to argue that the Court's 
decisions were justified on originalist and textualist grounds. 18 It 
is mystifying why Professor Koppelman persists in confusing 
theories of constitutional interpretation and policy defenses of 
constitutional provisions and in predicating his entire essay on a 
claim that I have suddenly adopted an interpretative theory 
never expressed in any of my work. 19 
Because of this fundamental error, Professor Koppelman 
expends enormous energy dissecting an article no one has writ-
ten. First, he suggests that I think the Court should decide cases 
by determining what is "the best thing for government to do. "20 
(As we will see, that interpretative method turns out to be more 
15. See, e.g., id. at511-12 (arguing that the Rchnquist Court correctly interprets the 
commerce clause); id. at 528 (providing textual defense of the Rehnquist Court's protec-
tion of the speech formation of median institutions); id. at 554-55 (defending Court's 
congruence between free exercise and free speech clauses on originalist grounds). 
16. See id. at567-68. 
17. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 23 n.56. 
18. I even noted an instance in which the Rehnquist's Court commerce clause doc-
trine, guided by the text of the Constitution, might well not comport with an appropriate 
economic understanding of decentralization. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 518. Such a 
discussion would not make sense if I believed that the Court should enforce a principle of 
subsidiarity rather the text of the Constitution, as modified by established precedent. 
19. It is particularly strange for Professor Koppelman to claim that I am shifting my 
views here, because I have always adopted the view that constitutional decisions must be 
rooted in an original understanding of text. See, e.g, John 0. McGinnis and Michael 
Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theorv, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 385,391 (2003) (describing commitment to an originalist form of intcrp;ctation). 
20. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 21. 
44 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:39 
Professor Koppelman's style of jurisprudence). To the contrary, 
the Court should try to best understand the meanings of the 
words of the Constitution, such as the compass of interstate 
commerce. In section two I will show that Professor Koppelman 
has not demonstrated that it is doing so in a politicized fashion?' 
A related problem is that he ignores the many constitutional 
provisions authorizing centralized authority that I also believe 
should be enforced according to their terms.Z2 
Second, given that the Supreme Court has not chosen these 
principles for itself as a policy matter, it is wrong to suggest that 
either the Court or I must prove that the principles it enforces 
are politically sound. The article discusses at some length the 
seeming paradox of a centralized institution enforcing principles 
of decentralization that were themselves centrally developed at 
the Constitutional Convention.23 The way out of this paradox is 
to recognize that the Court is enforcing provisions endorsed by a 
supermajoritarian consensus during the ratification process. As I 
describe briefly in this article and at length with Michael Rappa-
port elsewhere, the supermajoritarian origins of the Constitution 
and its amendment process make their provisions more likely 
beneficent than ordinary legislation and warrants their enforce-
ment over decisions of mere majorities, state or federal. 24 Thus, 
so long as the Court is enforcing these provisions, neither the 
Court nor I have to establish their utility. 
Professor Koppelman exaggerates to the point of misstate-
ment the limited observations I do make in support of the politi-
cal wisdom of decentralization. To provide some explanation of 
why the Court may be rediscovering the centralizing provisions 
of the Constitution, I do say that "the Great Society's reforms 
are widely believed to have had certain counterproductive con-
sequences."25 This statement describes a widely held view. The 
last Democratic President attempted to take steps to reform wel-
fare to get rid of some of these counterproductive consequences 
and himself stated that the "era of big government" is over.26 
More generally it is a commonplace among liberals and conser-
21. As I discuss below at notes 37-66 and accompanying text. 
22. For an example, see infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. 
23. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 567-68. 
24. See id.; John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian 
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703,802-03 (2002). 
25. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 502 (emphasis added). 
26. Alison Mitchell, Clinton Offers Challenge to Nation, Declaring "Era of Big 
Government Is Over" N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1996, at A1 (quoting President Clinton's State 
of the Union Address). 
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vatives alike that we take more seriously the advantages of mar-
kets and market-like structures than we did in the 1960s.27 Pro-
fessor Koppelman tries to turn this modest descriptive point into 
a claim that I believe that a vast array of government programs, 
including "Social Security, the Securities Exchange Commission, 
and the National Labor Relations Act" are "counterproductive 
failures."28 Last time I looked these were New Deal, not Great 
Society, programs and I called no particular program a failure. 
(That is not to say of course that important aspects of even New 
Deal programs have not been criticized29 and reforms have been 
suggested even by people other than those in the right wing of 
the Republican party).30 More generally, it is quite clear that my 
article is concerned with social norms rather than economic ones 
and does not attack federal economic regulation.31 
In response to this reply, Professor Koppelman surprisingly 
attempts to defend his claim that my original article argued that 
a vast array of New Deal programs are "counterproductive fail-
ures." He suggests that in the prior sentence to the one discussed 
in the paragraph above I "lumped" the two eras together when I 
said "the political world today and the political theory that maps 
it look very different from those of either the late New Deal or 
the Warren Court" and that I then "cite skepticism" about 
bothY What I then actually said was "skepticism about highly 
centralized government as a rational planner of broad social re-
form has grown since the Great Society's reforms were widely 
seen to have had certain counterproductive consequences." Let 
us assume that this statement fairly implies that skepticism of 
government has grown since the New Deal era as well as that of 
the Great Society. It is baffling that Professor Koppelman thinks 
27. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New 
Constitutional Order and The Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 29, 34 (1999) (contrasting the New Deal I Great Society regime with the current 
regime). 
28. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 31. 
29. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONE PLACE OF REDRESS 85-117 (2001) (criti-
cizing New Deal Labor laws as harmful to minorities). 
30. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, hardly a conservative Republican, recently 
chaired a bipartisan committee which recommended reform of Social Security, including 
the development of private accounts. See James Toedtman, Panel's Social Security Solu-
tions, NEWSDAY, Dec. 12, 2001, at A22. 
31. See, e.g., McGinnis, supra note 1, at 517 (noting that even after Lopez, Congress re-
tains plenary economic powers). My article acknowledges that the plight of African-
Americans caused by the "original sin of slavery" -a state sponsored form of discrimination-
may require more centralized intervention even now, let alone in the 1960s-an intervention 
justified in many cases by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments. Jd. at 536-37. 
32. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 21 n.lOl. 
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that this mild observation about changes in social thought, which 
he does not dispute, requires one to believe that a vast swathe of 
New Deal programs were, in Professor Koppelman's words, not 
mine, "counterproductive failures." Sadly, in this relatively 
smaller matter as well as the much larger matter of interpretative 
principle, Professor Koppelman persists in baldly misstating the 
positions in my original article. 
Professor Koppelman also completely and revealingly mis-
understands the reason that I am consciously quite tentative in 
many of my conclusions about the beneficence of substantive 
norms?3 For instance, the article does say that "sexual restraint 
may be a positive norm" for some and that such norms may need 
a religious framework for support. 34 The article, however, does 
not say or imply, as Professor Koppelman says, that the Court 
should use these "hunches" to arrive at constitutional princi-
ples.35 I make these remarks in the context of observing that the 
Court is rightly getting rid of the incorrect interpretation of the 
establishment clause that made it harder for norms generated by 
religions to compete on an equal basis with secular ideas.36 It is 
precisely because neither Professor Koppelman nor I nor some 
central authority is good at evaluating the beneficence of such 
norms (even assuming, as I do not, that they are equally benefi-
cent for everyone) that I am tentative in my views of their value, 
believing that the competition provided by constitutional discov-
ery machines does a better job than armchair analysis of sorting 
them. As we will see, it is Professor Koppelman who wants to 
translate his hunches about such matters as the subordination of 
women to fabricate a substantive code of norms. 
Even on their own terms, Professor Koppelman's attacks on 
decentralization are feeble. (That is not to say that stronger ones 
could not be mounted: my article itself acknowledges that decen-
tralizing structures have weaknesses.)37 He spends a few pages 
attacking Texas as an oligarchy with statistics drawn from a book 
33. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 30. 
34. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 506. 
35. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 30. 
36. Professor Koppelman has little to say about my discussion of the Rehnquist 
Court's construction of the religion clauses. He says the Rehnquist Court religion juris-
prudence has been "statist," see Koppelman, supra note 2, at 18 n.24, never grappling 
with my demonstration that the Rehnquist Court permits religious norms to compete on 
an equal basis but no more than equal basis with other norms. He also says the 
Rehnquist Court is promoting "religious triumphalism" without explaining why allowing 
religious schools to participate on equal basis with secular schools gives religion a fa-
vored let alone a triumphalist role. /d. 
37. McGinnis, supra note 1, at507. 
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whose premise is Texas should have higher levels of welfare and 
redistribution.38 The success of decentralization in the United 
States obviously cannot be assessed by statistics from a single 
state. His discussion also focuses only on economic matters when 
the Court's doctrine and my essay focuses on decentralization in 
social norms. 
In any event, Professor Koppelman's basic claim that an oli-
garchy has prevented Texas from having the higher welfare 
benefits that its citizens desire is not persuasive. He argues that 
oligarchy has prevented these benefits by depressing voter rates 
through failing to reform campaign finance laws and other bad 
acts.39 But we have no evidence that such campaign finance is at 
fault for low turnouts. Texas has more Hispanics than other 
states and Hispanics have low turnout rates.40 To actually under-
stand the complex reasons for low voter turnouts in Texas, one 
would have to investigate many factors that Professor Koppel-
man does not. 
But what is most striking about his discussion of Texas is his 
failure to mention, let alone, to grapple with, the most important 
protection that decentralization provides those potentially op-
pressed by oligarchy. If Texas has policies that an oligarchy is 
sustaining, over time the many who are not part of the oligarchy 
can leave. Unfortunately for Professor Koppelman, Texas has 
been one of the fastest growing states in the union, moving from 
the sixth to second in population rank in the last five decades.41 
In contrast, states whose policies he would appear to prefer, like 
many of those in the Northeast, have been losing people.42 Pro-
fessor Koppelman is right to be concerned that a polity's policy 
mix may diverge from the preferences of its citizens. That is a 
consequence of the agency costs of government. What is unac-
38. See CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS 271 (1990). 
See also Koppelman, supra note 2, at 32-34 (discussing Texas). 
39. !d. at 33-34. 
40. In the Nov. 2000 election, the percentage of eligible voters that actually voted 
was as follows: Hispanic: 45.1 %; Black: 56.8%; White (non-Hispanic): 61.8%. See Re-
ported Voting and Registration by Selected Characteristics, VOTING AND REGISTRATION 
IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2002, at 6. 
41. Texas's population growth is a result not only of foreign immigration but immigra-
tion from other states. See UNITED STATES CENSUS OF POPULATIONS 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 
2000 (showing that Texas has a growing population born in other states of the United States). 
42. See Geographic Mobility March-1999 March 2000, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, May 2001, at 5. Three of the 
largest states in the Northeast had the highest tax burdens in the nation. See John B. Bur-
bidge & Gordon M. Myers, Population Mobility and Capital Tax Competition, 24 
REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS, 441 (1994). 
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countable is his failure even to discuss exit rights as a limit on 
those agency costs-a point made in my own piece-or offer any 
explanation of why agency costs would not often be worse at the 
federal level where exit rights are less effective. For instance, if 
the United States adopts policies that depress employees' wages 
without corresponding benefits, it is much harder for people of 
modest means to leave the country than to leave a single state. 
II. THE EMPTY BOX OF PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN'S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Once Professor Koppelman's misunderstanding of my juris-
prudential position is cleared up, his own jurisprudential critique 
is insubstantial. He argues that the Court has been wrong to en-
force the limitations of the commerce clause in such cases as 
United States v. Lopez. 43 But, as we have seen, the basis of a sub-
stantive critique cannot be the claim that the Court is improperly 
basing its decisions on its assessment of "what is, all things con-
sidered, the best thing for government to do."44 Neither the 
Court nor I embrace this kind of construction, instead interpret-
ing the commerce clause according to normal principles of legal 
construction by taking account of both its original understanding 
and precedent. Since he admits that Justice Thomas may be right 
in his construction of the original understanding of the com-
merce clause,45 his critique cannot be that the Court lacks 
originalist support for its conclusion that carrying guns next to a 
school is not interstate commerce.46 
Professor Koppelman suggests in passing two other possible 
avenues of complaint. First, he notes that his bar review lecturer 
told him that Con.Bress could do whatever it wanted to under the 
commerce clause. 7 I freely concede that the Court may have up-
set Professor Koppelman's and his lecturer's expectations. But 
their expectations are not the law. The United States never 
passed a constitutional amendment providing Congress with 
43. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
44. This is the principal claim of Professor Koppelman's essay made in italics. See 
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 21. 
45. /d. at 23. Professor Koppelman docs briefly suggest that originalism is indeter· 
minate, id., but makes no serious attempt to show this, or why any other judicial method· 
ology is better. 
46. Unlike other scholars, see, e.g., Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the 
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000), Professor Koppel-
man does not make an argument that the judiciary should not enforce the limitations of 
the enumerated powers because the political process can be entrusted to enforce them. 
47. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 19. 
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plenary powers and the only way a provision of the Constitution, 
like the limitations in the commerce clause, can wholly disappear 
is through the amendment process.48 
As a matter of judicial review, it is thus appropriate for the 
Court to return to the original understanding when that under-
standing is not foreclosed by precedent. Indeed, because the 
provisions of the Constitution have a presumption of greater be-
neficence than those norms passed by a majoritarian legislature, 
the Court has a duty under judicial review to maintain them 
when it can distinguish prior cases. In Lopez, the Court found a 
distinction between commercial matters and non-commercial 
matters that squares the prior cases with its new doctrine and re-
stores some of the original understanding.49 If Professor Kop-
pelman believes that the Court cannot enforce any aspect of the 
original understanding unless it enforces the original under-
standing in every respect, he betrays a misunderstanding of how 
law works. The Court has and should attempt to harmonize, as 
far it is able, the original understanding with past precedent. A 
Court might be accused of exercising political discretion if it 
overruled a lot of cases without offering any consistent and prin-
cipled basis for doing so, but the Rehnnquist Court has over-
ruled no cases in its commerce clause jurisprudence and few in 
the area of federalism generally.50 
Professor Koppelman's only attack on the commercial-
noncommercial distinction on which Lopez relies is that it is "in-
determinate."51 But he makes no sustained argument to this ef-
fect and does not tell us why it is more indeterminate than other 
distinctions in constitutional law like those between commercial 
speech and noncommercial speech and those between a public 
forum and a limited public forum. He does suggest that this dis-
tinction would deprive Congress of "all authority over such non-
trivial matters as the spoliation of the environment."52 This claim 
is a very substantial overstatement and is inattentive to actual 
constitutional doctrine: most environmental laws can be upheld 
because the regulations apply to manufacturing-dearly a com-
48. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 24, at 795 n.393 (critiquing Bruce Ac-
kerman's theory of "constitutional moments" as being unable to explain the difference 
between the effect of constitutional amendments and precedent). 
49. Professor Koppelman does not attack the Court's distinctions of prior case law 
in his essay. 
50. See John 0. McGinnis, Continuity and Coherence in the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 875 (2003) (discussing adherence to precedent in the Rehnquist Court). 
51. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 24. 
52. !d. at 22 (emphasis added). 
50 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 20:39 
mercial process. 53 It may be true that the Court's construction of 
the commerce clause will prevent regulation of wetlands that are 
within a single state and are not being used commercially.54 But 
while Professor Koppelman clearly does not like this result, he 
does not explain why that is a fatal defect of the construction of 
the commerce clause. Just a few pages earlier in his essay he dis-
paraged a jurisprudence in which the Court decided cases on the 
basis of what is the best thing for government to do.55 Perhaps it 
would be better to give the federal government authority over 
noncommercial wetlands, but by his own argument that consid-
eration should not dictate judicial construction. 
At times Professor Koppelman sug~ests that commerce 
clause jurisprudence is inevitably political,5 but he does not clar-
ify why it requires any more political judgment than other issues 
on which he believes the Court should rule, such as the First 
Amendment's applicability to campaign finance regulations. 
Withholding commerce clause authority over noncommercial 
matters will affect federal legislation favored by both the left and 
right. For instance, because Congress does not have the plenary 
authority imagined by Professor Koppelman's bar review lec-
turer, the Court cannot use the commerce clause to ban same sex 
marriage or penalize someone for possessing obscene literature 
made at home.57 If the Court nevertheless upheld such a law, we 
might be right in concluding that it could not be trusted with the 
commerce clause. But until then Professor Koppelman has not 
demonstrated that the new commerce clause jurisprudence is in-
capable of being applied in a neutral way to invalidate both fed-
eral overreaching whether of the left or the right. 
Professor Koppelman's discussion of section 5 power also 
fails to offer convincing textual, structural or precedential argu-
ments against the Court's and my position, but instead implies 
that my position suggests that the federal government must per-
53. See, e.g., Allied Local & Regional Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215 F.3d 61,82 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (upholding amendments to the Clean Air Act against a commerce clause challenge). 
54. See Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (suggesting that Congress's attempt to regulate noncommer-
cial wetlands would raise serious constitutional questions). For an excellent explorauon 
of the doctrinal developments of this case, see Christine A. Klein, The Environmencal 
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
55. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 21. 
56. See, e.g., id. at 15. 
57. Judge Stephen Reinhardt recently used the commerce clause jurisprudence to 
hold that the federal government could not ban possession of child pornography. See 
United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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mit rape and lynching.58 He simply fails to consider an interme-
diate construction of the Fourteenth Amendment between one 
that provides the federal government with plenary power and 
one that mandates federal acquiescence in the raping and lynch-
ing of particular groups. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was not a focus of my original 
article, and I can provide here only the briefest sketch of why this 
mediating position is a sound reading of Fourteenth Amendment 
precedent and the text of section 5. At the outset I should note 
that much of the jurisprudence on section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is questionable as an original matter if only because 
the Court discarded the privileges or immunities clause rather 
than interpret it to preclude invidious discrimination in state de-
terminations of civil rights.59 The Court has interpreted the equal 
protection clause, however, to some similar effects. 
Of course, all laws discriminate between groups defined in 
some fashion. The Court has thus long limited the application of 
the equal protection clause to requiring a rational basis for dis-
crimination except when either the presence of a susruect class or 
fundamental rights requires a higher level of scrutiny. 0 This inter-
pretation permits the Amendment to address the plight of African-
Americans at whom it was addressed and to invalidate other classi-
fications based on invidious status classifications. This construction 
also helps the amendment cohere with the federalist structure of 
the government, preventing the federal government from simply 
overriding any distinctions in state laws that it opposes. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be con-
strued to reflect this basic structure, because its language simply 
permits Congress to "enforce, by appropriate provisions, the 
provisions of this article." By its text, Congress is limited to en-
58. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 27. Professor Koppelman is a little unclear here. 
At the end of his discussion Professor Koppelman informs us that "rape and lynching" 
arc social norms as if my theory suggests that Court should allow state experimentation 
with such norms. /d. at 27 & n.74. If my theory requires the federal government to acqui-
esce in state policies that permit some groups to be raped and murdered, it is a serious 
charge. If my theory docs not, this sentence does no work other than to cast innuendos 
on both the Court and my theory of the Court. 
59. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 
YALE L.J. 1385, 1387 (1992) (arguing that privileges or immunities clause does not pro-
vide substantive rights but a non-discrimination principle on granting rights). Under this 
view the equal protection clause provides a separate nondiscrimination principle in the 
administration of those legal rights. 
60. See, e.g., San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 2 (1973); see also 
Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and the Protection of Civil 
Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (2002) 
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forcement which does not generally connote a special power of 
interpretation over and above Congress's ability to interpret any 
provision of the Constitution.61 The language of appropriateness 
also does not suggest that the judiciary should defer to Congress' 
interpretation of the precedin~ sections any more than any other 
provision of the Constitution.6 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garretf3 -
criticized by Professor Koppelman-presents an analysis of sec-
tion 5 that grows out of this understanding. Garrett means that in 
the absence of a suspect class or fundamental rights, the Congress 
can use its enforcement power only to act against irrational dis-
crimination and even then only with a remedy that is "congruent 
and proportional" to the targeted violation.64 While Professor 
Koppelman, like Justice Breyer in dissent, believes that Congress 
should be given leeway to define what is a suspect class and what 
constitutes irrational discrimination, this view does not flow from 
the circumscribed authority that Congress enjoys under the lan-
guage of section 5. The scope for states to compete in the forma-
tion of appropriate social norms afforded by this construction also 
has the advantages described in my article. But under this con-
struction, Congress nevertheless can set bounds to this competi-
tion by protecting suspect classes, who tend to be the subject of 
discrimination wherever they move, and by outlawing irrational 
discrimination in any state. 
Accordingly, nothing justifies Professor Koppelman's impli-
cation that Garrett or my theory leaves the federal government 
powerless to stamp out rape and lynching.65 If a state discrimi-
61. See Saikrishna Prakash, A Comment on Congressional Enforcement, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 193, 201 (1998). The language does permit Congress the ability to fashion prophy-
lactic rules to help enforce the Amendment. 
62. !d. at 204. According to Professor Koppelman, I fail to grapple with the "devastating 
originalist" arguments against that the proposition that the Court has the exclusive authority to 
interpret the Constitution. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 25 n.63. As a departmentalist, I have 
never believed that Court has such "exclusive interpretive authority," but it does have author-
ity to provide its own independent interpretation of the Constitution in the context of a case, 
except where the Constitution lodges that authority elsewhere. I argue that the text of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not provide such an exception. 
63. 531 u.s. 356 (2001 ). 
64. Rotunda, supra note 60, at 1188. This interpretation is confirmed by Nevada 
Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), where the Court recently upheld 
Congress's ability to subject states to legal liability for violating a family medical leave 
act -a statute passed in response to sexual stereotypes. 
65. Professor Koppelman's response to this point is a nonsequitur. It is to reiterate 
that the Court invalidated the Violence Against Women Act in Morrison and some other 
past statutes. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 27 n.74. But there Congress failed to structure 
the act in accordance with the powers it undoubtedly has under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to act against state officials who are enforcing laws that discriminate against pro-
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nates in its enforcement of rape and murder laws, thereby failing 
to protect a group of victims, it is obviously engaged in discrimi-
nation that has no rational basis. (Since all states to my knowl-
edge have laws that severely punish rape and lynching, Professor 
Koppelman must be concerned about the maladministration of 
those laws rather than a state's failure to enact them). The fed-
eral government can and should create causes of actions, crimi-
nal and civil, which will impose sufficiently harsh penalties that 
the acquiescence in rape and lynching will disappear. 
Professor Koppelman's critique of Dale v. Boy Scouts of 
America66 follows the now familiar pattern of ignoring textual 
arguments and then demanding that constitutional doctrine lack 
all nuance. My support for the decision was rooted in a construc-
tion of the First Amendment which he does not discuss.67 In-
stead, he declares that the decision logically requires that all 
antidiscrimination laws are unconstitutional.68 In my article, I 
suggested reasons that many other antidiscrimination laws could 
be distinguished and successfully applied. First, insofar as they 
apply to commercial enterprises, such enterprises may receive 
less protection for discrimination in employment because their 
overall purpose is not expressive.69 Second, a state may have a 
compelling interest to prevent discrimination against suspect 
classes, like African-Americans and other minorities.70 Such a 
development of Dale would allow competition without upsetting 
established law. It also demonstrates the extravagance of Profes-
sor Koppelman's charge that Dale can be explained only by a 
special affection for the Boy Scouts or a particular disdain for 
protections for homosexuals-a charge belied by the Court's de-
cision in Romer v. Evans.71 
tected classes or who fail to enforce laws because of discrimination. Once again Professor 
Koppelman seems to have no interest in seeing whether careful attention to text and 
precedent actually leads to the consequences he imputes to interpretations of the Consti-
tution that he dislikes. 
66. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
67. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 528. In response, Professor Koppelman notes 
that he addresses my textual arguments in a not yet published essay to which I can hardly 
have been expected to reply. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 117 n.76. For purposes of this 
essay, however, it is significant that he acknowledges that I argued for the jurisprudential 
correctness of Dale on the basis of a text of the Constitution. Professor Koppelman here 
provides more evidence that his claim that I believe the Court should enforce a principle 
of subsidiarity rather than constitutional provisions, many of which have decentralizing 
effects, is false. 
68. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 27. 
69. McGinnis, supra note 1, at 537. 
70. ld. 
71. 517 u.s. 620 (1996). 
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Moreover, distinctions that depend on the nature of the or-
ganization regulated and the nature of the discrimination law at 
issue are necessary under any reasonable view of First Amend-
ment protection for expressive association. Without such distinc-
tions it is unclear why the government could not apply antidis-
crimination laws to require an organization dedicated to reviving 
laws against sodomy to admit homosexual members, to require 
the Catholic Church to hire female priests, and to require De-
mocrats to permit Republicans to help determine the identity of 
their candidates.72 
Professor Koppelman also complains the Boy Scouts deci-
sion protects a large organization rather than a small, local or-
ganization and this undermines the decentralizing import of the 
decision. But this observation does not undermine either the 
jurisprudential or public policy soundness of the decision. As a 
jurisprudential matter, the First Amendment has never been in-
terpreted to provide differential protection of organizations on 
the basis merely of their size.73 As a public policy matter, Alexis 
de Tocqueville celebrated both localities and mediating institu-
tions, not just local institutions.74 In a continental republic, large 
mediating institutions are useful because they have the heft to 
compete in their social norms with our huge institutions of gov-
ernment. But if local chapters of the Boy Scouts are unhappy 
with the policy of the larger organization, they can secede and, if 
they wish, join other organizations with similar goals but without 
the policy. Even large and very well established organizations 
risk radical decline when they take a path that triggers exodus by 
their members: just ask some of the mainline Protestant 
churches. In contrast, the antidiscrimination provision at issue in 
Dale would have made it impossible for any purely local organi-
zation in New Jersey to pursue the Boy Scouts' goals using the 
Boy Scouts' policies. Thus, Professor Koppelman's claim that the 
Dale decision detracts from decentralization is not correct as a 
policy matter if we look at the sum total of local expressive asso-
ciation at issue. 
72. As I discussed at length in my article, see McGinnis, supra note 1, at 538-40, in a 
decision that mirrors Dale the Supreme Court held that government could not require 
Republicans to permit Democrats to participate in their primary. See California Democ-
ratic Primary v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000). 
73. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51-53 (1975) (holding that individuals were at 
liberty to spend as much of their money on their own election campaigns as they wished). 
74. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 115 (Phillips Brad-
ley ed., 1990). 
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III. PROFESSOR KOPPELMAN'S EMBRACE 
OF OLIGARCHY 
Professor Koppelman's attack on the Rehnquist Court's en-
forcement of decentralizing structures takes its most peculiar 
turn when he praises the jurisprudence of abortion as making the 
norm about abortion "more decentralized than any other rule of 
law could" be.75 With respect, this claim makes his entire posi-
tion incoherent at both the level of judicial methodology and of 
substantive political theory. Having criticized the Rehnquist 
Court's federalism jurisprudence for the political discretion it 
provides, he makes no attempt in his reply to show how Roe is 
not similarly based on political considerations. Much of my 
original article showed how fundamental rights jurisprudence 
could not be a part of a jurisprudence of decentralization be-
cause its norms were simply fabricated by the Supreme Court.76 I 
expressly contrasted the enforcement of these norms with ones 
rooted in the text of the Constitution. 77 
Thus, Professor Koppelman's criticisms of decentralization 
as mask for judges' political decisions ring hollow in light of the 
kind of jurisprudence he endorses. It is certainly coherent to re-
ject judicial review altogether and thus to oppose both enforcing 
the limitations of the commerce clause and individual rights. It is 
also coherent to adopt a jurisprudence focusing on reinforcing 
democracy and thus oppose both Roe and the enforcement of 
commerce clause limitations on the grounds that neither rein-
forces democracy. Criticizing the federalism cases for their inevi-
tably political character while embracing Roe, however, betrays 
a blindness to the contingency of one's own political commit-
ments. This blindness is widespread in the academy, perhaps be-
cause few academics know many people who oppose abortion.78 
Professor Koppelman's piece has other features that seem expli-
cable only by the expectation that his readers will have spent 
their lives in the academic echo chamber. For instance, he char-
acterizes (without any argument in support) "right-wing" Re-
publican ideas, like the privatization of social security, as "widely 
regarded as loony."79 He also denounces the majority in Bush v. 
75. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 36. 
76. McGinnis, supra note 1, at566. 
77. /d. at 567-68. 
78. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1678 (J 997). 
79. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 31. Many serious academic economists have sup-
ported social security privatization. See, e.g., Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Privatizing Social 
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Gore as a "manipulatin~ elite" without even showing why the 
case is wrongly decided. These kind of asides work only when 
you are sure that almost the entire audience is on your side.81 
It is true that Professor Koppelman cites his own article that 
provided a justification for Roe v. Wade82 but his own unique de-
fense of Roe proves the insularity of his approach. His claim 
there that laws against abortion violate the Thirteenth Amend-
ment because any unwanted pregnancy is "involuntary servi-
tude" would not persuade anyone one who was not alread~ per-
suaded that the Constitution contained a right to abortion. 3 It is 
not only that no reasonable person at the time would have 
thought that unwanted pregnancy was a form of involuntary ser-
vitude. Even now such an argument would be treated at best as a 
pun on labor rather than seriously advanced in a court of law. 
Servitude, particularly as the context of an amendment that was 
designed to end slavery relates to economic obligation, not fa-
milial obligations. Unwanted pregnancy is no more involuntary 
servitude than are the other unwanted obligations that may force 
parents to work for their children, like child support. In fact it is 
less so because these other obligations may trigger imprisonment 
if they are not kept. But even assuming the alternative universe 
in which a Court would apply this clause to the issue of abortion, 
Professor Koppelman still must make broad political assertions 
about the subordination of women to counter the obvious point 
that at least some women voluntarily become pregnant and then, 
changing their mind, wish to terminate a pregnancy.84 
Security: How it Works and Why it Matters, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 368 (1996). 
80. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 35 ("In the 2000 election the only elite that was 
manipulating the process to keep itself in power was the Republican-dominated Supreme 
Court."). 
81. Another indication of the confidence he has in his audience comes from his 
dismissal of originalism with two citations and without so much as a parenthetical de-
scribing their supposedly conclusive arguments. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 23 n.57. 
82. !d. at 36 n.127 (citing Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth 
Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990)). 
83. See Koppelman, supra note 82. 
84. !d. at 504-05. Professor Koppelman complains that I do not address his Thir-
teenth Amendment arguments in favor of a right to abortion-an argument which he did 
not himself describe in his original essay. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 36 n.l27. But I 
have just devoted a whole paragraph to challenging this argument as insubstantial. In 
fact, very few others have ever expended as much text discussing this claim. That Profes-
sor Koppelman's argument has not won any substantial support in the decade since he 
made it is yet another indication of its implausibility, because the overwhelming majority 
of academics favor abortion rights and would like nothing more than to put the decision 
on a more secure basis than Roe provided. And Professor Koppelman's decision to in-
voke orginalism, however factitious in its nature, while deriding originalism elsewhere, 
see id. at 23 n.57, is yet more evidence of the result-oriented nature of his jurisprudence. 
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But more than its methodological incoherence, Professor 
Koppelman's endorsement of Roe shows an incoherence in his 
substantive political philosophy. If one endorses the individual 
right of a woman to decide to terminate her pregnancy as a de-
centralizing norm, why would one not also endorse an individual 
right to contract as a decentralizing norm? Why does not the 
rule in Lochner, a case Professor Koppelman savages,85 similarly 
make norm creation, in Professor Koppelman's terms, "more 
decentralized than any other rule of law could" be by permitting 
each individual the decision to contract? Why does Lochner not 
allow individuals in Professor Koppelman's words to "take con-
trol of their own lives."86 No doubt some would say that a right 
to contract permits exploitation of interests of the defenseless, 
but millions of our fellow citizens think the same about the right 
to abortion. When norms acted on by individuals arguably do 
harm to some interest, whether the welfare or the worker or the 
fetus, and are not expression protected by the First Amendment, 
some political structure is need to sort out whether those norms 
are on the whole beneficial. 
Thus, Professor Koppelman's blithe embrace of Roe and 
equally blithe rejection of Lochner show that he has not begun 
to consider the hard questions that my article poses about the 
appropriate locus of norm creation. As I note there, generating 
the appropriate set of social norms-the balance between liberty 
and license, freedom and order-is the hardest issue for a de-
mocratic republic to get right.87 In more ancient forms of gov-
It is hard to think of any decision that was less prudent or more disturbing of settled 
practice than Roe. Yet prudence and respect for settled practice are supposedly the 
touchstones of Professor Koppelman's jurisprudence, see id. at 23 n.56. 
85. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 31-32. It is relatively unimportant but Professor 
Koppelman also misunderstands what little I have to say about Lochner. See id. at 31 
n.103 (complaining that Court could not be following "reigning economic" theories since 
democratic institutions passed statutes inconsistent with those theories). In saying that 
reigning economic theories inlluence the Court in Lochner I was expressly explaining 
why elite groups, like the Supreme Court, tend to follow social theories of other elites 
like the academy rather than "ratify unthinkingly the preferences of the denizens of a 
mass democracy." McGinnis, supra note 1, at 498. Thus it is irrelevant as an explanatory 
matter that the people in general did accept these theories, just as it is irrelevant if people 
in general today do not accept theories of sexual autonomy that have motivated the 
Court's sexual autonomy jurisprudence. More generally, it is perfectly plausible to say 
even today that reigning economic theories impugn such policies as rent control or pro-
tectionist tariffs, while recognizing that some democratic institutions nevertheless pass 
those laws. Evolution too is a reigning scientific theory even if a majority of people in this 
nation does not agree with it. 
86. Koppelman, supra note 2, at 36. 
87. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 520-21. See also Nelson Lund, Federalism and 
Civil Liberties, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1060-64 (1997). 
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ernment, determining the appropriate set of social norms was 
not so problematic because they were written down on divine 
tablets, sung by oracles, or dictated by the anointed. Discovering 
the appropriate norms may well be even harder in our era than 
in previous republican ones because large technological changes 
may call for rapid transformation of norms. Hence my focus on 
reviving structures of the Constitution that create discovery ma-
chines for social norms in the expectation that through competi-
tion and experimentation we will discover the right norms. Such 
provisions comport with the republicanism born in the English 
Enlightenment, because they try to create a political structure 
comporting with the empiricism and skepticism that are the 
hallmarks of that tradition. 
Professor Koppelman either fails to understand this essen-
tial problem of republican governance, or proposes a solution 
that is reactionary in the sense of approximating the ancient 
forms of discovering social norms. For all his talk of democracy, 
Professor Koppelman's solution for the discovery of the most sa-
lient norms is to return us to a deus ex mach ina- in the form of 
the Supreme Court justices. They will discern the appropriate 
norms for essential issues of our day, whether cloning or assisted 
suicide, in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, the mysteries of 
substantive due process, or perhaps worst of all, like Professor 
Koppelman himself, in oracular inferences from provisions that 
have nothing to do with the question at hand.88 This process is 
deeply oligarchic in that it is driven by an elite group that is iso-
lated in either Washington or in the academy from the ebb and 
flow of civic forces within the nation. The process provides no 
assurance that these norms have received a majoritarian en-
dorsement, let alone the supermajority that should be required 
before overriding a majoritarian consensus. Finally, such a juris-
prudence cuts off the experimentation in social norms that helps 
filter good norms from bad. 
Professor Koppelman's self-contradictory critique is para-
digmatic of a larger failure of much of contemporary left-liberal 
scholarship in the era of the Rehnquist Court. Liberal constitu-
88. Professor Koppelman's willingness to cite the Thirteenth Amendment to sup-
port a right to abortion is thus no more a defense to the claim that he wants to enforce 
preferred rights not found in the Constitution any more than Justice Douglas's citation of 
the Third Amendment is a defense to the claim that Griswold supports unenumerated 
rights. Indeed, because they are less candid than a frank avowal of an unenumerated 
rights approach, the factitious arguments of Justice Douglas and Professor Koppelman 
have the potential to be even more corrosive of the Constitution. 
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tional theory (with substantial exceptions in the works such as 
those of John Hart Ely and Akhil Amar) has put itself into a box 
because of its previous treatment of the Warren Court. Having 
defended those decisions ideologically rather than by the use of 
text, history, or precedent, many liberal constitutional scholars 
have deprived themselves of most of the ammunition in the ar-
senal of constitutional interpretation. They can hardly attack the 
Rehnquist Court on the basis of text or the original understand-
ing, because the Warren Court's decisions they most applaud 
were indifferent and often hostile to text and the original under-
standing. They lack standing to impugn the Rehnquist Court for 
any failure to follow precedent, because the Warren Court 
shredded precedent on many of the occasions where it was most 
celebrated. Such scholars are thus largely left to complaints 
about judicial activism which seem hypocritical in light of their 
past romances or to outright ideological complaints whose juris-
prudential thinness seems better suited to the soapbox. 
CONCLUSION 
Ideally a theory of the Constitution should both correctly 
construe its individual provisions and offer a theory of the way 
that these provisions form a coherent whole. The strength of 
John Hart E~y's defense of the Warren Court lay in his ability to 
provide plausible constructions of the text of individual provi-
sions and then to weave them together to show that they had a 
more general pattern of democracy reinforcement.89 My aspira-
tions are similar, even if my construction of constitutional provi-
sions and the more overarching theme I discover within them are 
not identical. Neither Ely nor I engage in free-form constitution-
alism: we believe that decisions have a textual basis, and I, at 
least, believe the decisions have a basis in the original under-
standing. Professor Koppelman's first major error is to cast my 
article as an effort in free-form constitutionalism. His second 
major error is his failure to look in the mirror and see that his 
complaints against the Rehnquist Court's doctrine-that it is 
masking the political value judgments of oligarchs-perfectly fit 
many of his own positions. Professor Koppelman has not so 
much replied to my article as replied to himself. 
89. See JOHN HART ELY. DEMOCRACY AND OISTRCST (1980). 
